High Speed Attack Submarine

Background

Until 1955, there was a steady series of submarine reactor core developments and submarine designs that rapidly advanced the state of the art. This included S1W, S2W (used in Nautilus), S1G, S2G (used in SSN 575), S3W (used in SSN 578, 583, and 587), S4W (used in SSN 579 and 584), S3G, and S4G, However, these success also led to increasing demands for more capabilities and more submarines including Polaris missile submarines. In 1955, the S5W reactor was a revolutionary design and designated the high speed submarine reactor supporting a single propulsion shaft, longer life, and higher power. It was given high priority and would be the fleet work horse for years to come. The first ship with the S5W core was USS Skipjack (SSN 585) launched in May 1958 and went on sea trials in March 1959. By the time of these sea trials, five shipyards were building S5W-powered submarines including 6 attack submarines and 5 Polaris missile submarines. Eventually, there would be 58 S5W attack submarines and 41 S5W missile submarines.

However, never absent from the minds of those that design, planned, and authorized these submarines was the threat of the potential enemy. The primary concern was the potential advance of Soviet submarines and the potential for them to pour their energy into numbers that the US couldn't match. As a result, maintaining technological superiority was essential. Rickover was at the forefront of this concern and he envisioned the need for much higher speed submarine that could escort fast surface strike forces/convoys and protect them from hostile submarines.

Selling the Concept

Beginning in 1963, Rickover initiated concept assessments of feasibility. In March 1964, Rickover broached the concept to the House Appropriations Committee and in April he tasked Electric Boat to begin preliminary designs. With those results quickly in hand - Rickover turned to Rear Admiral Eugene

P. Wilkinson, director of the submarine warfare division (Op-31) in the office of the chief of naval operations. The first commanding officer of the Nautilus and an experienced submariner, Wilkinson knew well the value of speed. In July, he agreed to request a study within the navy for a high-speed

submarine. This led to a September 1964 request from the CNO to BuShips for this study and in October 1964, Naval Reactors assigned detailed division of responsibilities for the effort to KAPL and Electric Boat.

In March 1965, Naval Reactors, KAPL, and Electric Boat settle on the general features of the high-speed plant. However, Rickover was concerned that while Electric Boat did good work, they had been the lead yard for every new nuclear submarine plant, and Rickover felt that it wasn't wise to be dependent on a single source. He was also growing concerned that Electric Boat costs were growing and a second source was needed.

Seemingly Endless Studies and Debate

In September 1965, Electric Boat had completed the preliminary design work and the resulting feasibility study was sent to the CNO. On that same day, shipyard design responsibilities for the propulsion plant were transferred from Electric Boat to Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company in Newport News Virginia. KAPL would remain the lead design laboratory.

In October 1965, the CNO asks for more information/tradeoff studies on the Fast-Escort submarine but is convinced that it would be a valuable addition and requests efforts to include the ship in the FY68 shipbuilding program. The CNO provides a set of Single Sheet Characteristics to be used.

In January 1966, BuShips provides the CNO with budgetary needs for FY67 to support a FY68 authorization and tradeoff studies were performed during the 1st half of 1966.

In August 1966, the Ship Development Objective (set of objective requirements) and the ship officially becomes the "High Speed Nuclear Attack Submarine" and the target authorization is shifted to FY69.

For the next year, there is a steady series of debates on characteristics for the submarine and on whether FY68 authorization can be achieved. Finally, frustrated with the slow progress, in June 1967, VADM Rickover meets with Director Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to discuss the submarine situation. VADM Rickover points out deficiencies in methods used to design and build submarines, and the increasing lead time required to obtain approval to proceed with new developments. VADM Rickover points out that the Soviets are making their submarine program a national effort . VADM Rickover reviews the history of the High Speed submarine. DDR&E agrees with the need for the High Speed submarine, and agrees to give the matter his immediate attention.

Meanwhile, NR continues to work propulsion plant development and, in August 1967, VADM Rickover informs the CNO that the high speed submarine propulsion plant development has reached the stage where vendor commitments for component size and weight are required and that the delivery date of the ship will be controlled by the date funds are provided for procurement of long lead time propulsion plant components. Also, in August 1967, Rickover meets with the Secretary of the Navy on the urgency of the submarine in view of the Soviet submarine threat.

Quick Change in the Perceived Need

In December 1967, the OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis and Sea Warfare Systems both state that more concept studies are needed and that the high-speed submarine is "The wrong boat, at the wrong time, for the wrong reasons". The concern was that a considerably smaller, quieter, and faster ship requiring a smaller crew, using micro-miniaturized electronics, and costing far less money than the submarine may be possible in the near future. Also, analysis in late-1967 showed that Amrican technical superiority of the Soviets was so great that only a few more submarines were needed and then building could stop.

However, as a student of history, Rickover was aware that at the outset of two world wars, the submarine had been grossly underestimated and had nearly been the weapon of victory. Some of his engineers, if not versed in history, were experienced in the intractable and unpredictable nature of

technology, and they were convinced that so much had to go so well to obtain the postulated results. Not enough weight had been given to the rate of American obsolescence nor to a much greater speed of Russian progress than anticipated. Although they had little hard proof to back their contention, Rickover, Naval Reactors, and some officers believed it dangerously possible that the Russian submarine threat was growing far more swiftly than expected by those who had set the force level.

In December, January, and February, Rickover pushes heavily in the Pentagon within OSD and the SecNav offices for the high speed submarine. Rickover emphasizes that delays for further studies is unnecessary and hazardous to the country. In January 1968, intelligence briefings to the House Armed Services Committee stunned the committee with satellite photos of Soviet submarine building yards, estimates of Soviet building, and surprising speed of the new Soviet November class submarine. Specifically, On 5 January 1968, less than a week after the secretary of defense had

turned down the high-speed submarine, they learned that Russian nuclear submarines were far faster

than anyone thought. That day in the Pacific a Russian November class submarine, in following the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, revealed a far greater speed than expected. Even more devastating, the November ship was not a new class. The Russians had put thirteen into

service between 1958 and 1964. This placed the Congressional committees solidly in Rickover's camp. In February 1968, during testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the committee agrees that if DoD will not fund the High Speed submarine propulsion plan they will consider including funding in the FY69 AEC authorization bill.

In late February 1968, Rickover recommends to OSD and the CNO's office that a board of senior representatives highly qualified and experienced in nuclear attack submarine design or operation be formed to determine [classified matter deleted]. VADM Rickover also recommends that this board consider what types of attack submarines the Navy should be designing for the future. The CNO's office (Op-31) creates the recommended ad hoc advisory committee.

On April 1968, the Ad Hoc recommends a set of revised Multiple Sheet Characteristics and recommends proceeding with the high speed submarine in the FY70 shipbuilding program.

In May and June 1968, more senior meetings in OSD and the Navy. In early June 1968, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee boarded the Dace (SSN 607) . The Committee Chairman had chosen the submarine because under Commander Kinnaird R. McKee she had achieved an outstanding record. The ship was to undertake various exercises with the Shark (SSN 591), a

slightly faster ship of the Skipjack class, playing the part of a hostile submarine. During the event only the most skillful maneuvering and handling, as well as the high state of training of officers and crew, enabled the Dace to maintain a slight edge. While McKee was not certain what impression the two-day operation had made, he was inclined to think it had been favorable. Subsequently, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee asks VADM Rickover to provide his personal opinion - and he responds that both FY70 submarines should be the new high speed attack submarines.

Decision

On July 1, 1968, OSD provided approval to include SSN-688 in the FY70 shipbuilding program and procurement of long-lead material in the FY69. The result was that the high-speed attack submarine was no longer one of a kind: the navy was to begin a new class of attack submarines, the Los Angeles

(SSN 688) class, with the goal of increasing the force level to 100 nuclear submarines. Of these, the Skipjack class would be the oldest

Results

Three SSN 688 class submarines would be authorized in in the FY70 shipbuilding program:

• SSN688 and 689 awarded to Newport News Shipbuilding

• SSN690 awarded to Electric Boat

The construction contract to Newport News Shipbuilding was awarded in January 1971, keel laid in January 1972, launched in April 1974, and commissioned November 1976. This was a lead ship construction span of 70 months.

SSN 688 Class submarines would be authorized at a very aggressive pace:

• FY70 - 3 submarines

• FY71 - 4 submarines

• FY72 - 5 submarines

• FY 73 - 6 submarines

62 SSN 688 Class submarines would eventually be built with the last SSN 773 commissioned in September 1996 and still in service - 60 years after Rickover started fighting for the high speed attack submarine.